The Chilcot Report: There is Truly Nothing to See Here


On July 6, 2016, Sir John Chilcot issued “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry” (TRII) on behalf of a private, independent inquiry that Prime Minister Gordon Brown had appointed Chilcot to head in 2009. He had previously participated in the oft-criticized Butler Report from 2004, which attempted to explain the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, a multinational effort sent to find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq following the 2003 invasion.

As the Iraq Survey group had found no significant caches of WMD that posed an immediate threat, the Butler Report suggested that future prime ministers more closely scrutinize intelligence on WMD and perceived immediate threats to national security in the future. This suggestion of discredit intelligence estimates and the following troubles of the invasion of Iraq as “honest mistakes” would repeat in Chilcot’s 2016 report. While Gordon Brown appointed Chilcot to head the inquiry, Foreign Minister David Miliband promised that “all but the most sensitive evidence would be published in the final report,” but also eased his co-religionists’ permanently frayed nerves by promising to BBC 4’s Today that “If you are looking for a great conspiracy, you are not going to find it.”

For the casual inquirer, Chilcot’s twelve-page statement will be sufficient to learn the basic findings of the report. The report’s 150 page Executive Summary provides a more detailed report of the TRII’s findings.

Much of the body of the gargantuan report covers the banalities of legal wrangling and foreign policy meetings regarding Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield, and the attempts of the UN, UK, and U.S. to contain and deter Iraq from developing WMD and posing a conventional military risk to its neighbors in the Middle East. Between no-fly zones, weapons inspectors, and human rights inspectors, many of the details will be familiar to anyone who remembers John Major, Tony Blair, and Bill Clinton’s administrations. One recurring pattern is the pressure being placed on Hans Blix and the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue searching for WMD after they came up empty-handed time after time. While the fine details may be of interest to scholars of international relations and historians of foreign relations, and the report omits the more potentially embarrassing sorts of coverage of everyone’s favorite Council on Foreign Relations demoness, our interest is in the buildup to the 2003 Iraq War.

In Chilcot’s statement, he notes the main questions for the inquiry as: 1) Whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in 2003, and 2) Whether the UK could–and should–have been better prepared for what followed. Stating the obvious, Chilcot noted that “The UK’s relationship with the US was a determining factor in the Government’s decisions over Iraq.” While the Bush Administration steadily moved toward a policy of regime change in Iraq following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Chilcot explained, Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Cabinet remained devoted to disarmament of Iraq and its president Saddam Hussein’s forces until the end of 2002. By eventually joining the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Chilcot stated that the inquiry concluded “that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.” Chilcot’s report also stated

  • “The judgements (sic) about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction–WMD–were presented with a certainty that was not justified.”
  • “Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.”
  • “The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.”

Discussing the U.S./UK relationship, the statement noted that Blair urged U.S. President George W. Bush not to “take hasty action” on Iraq after 9/11. By April 2002, Blair was still committed to containing Iraq, but the Cabinet Office’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had determined that Saddam would not leave office without a formal military invasion. According to the JIC, Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with, had to disarm or be disarmed, and the JIC began issuing threats of force if Iraq did not comply. Bush and Blair took their case on Iraq to the UN, alleging that Iraq had supported terrorist organizations, had been producing WMD, had committed “extremely grave” human rights violations, had violated the weapons inspection program, and had used profits from the “oil for food” program to purchase weapons rather than food for its people. After Bush’s address to the General Assembly, the United States Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1441, offering Iraq a “final chance” to comply with disarmament obligations laid out by previous UN resolutions.

According to Chilcot, Bush gave up on Iraqi elections as a solution to the problem the following month, in December 2002. Blair agreed to action on Iraq by mid-March. Although Bush and Blair both wanted a second resolution passed, which would outline Iraq’s violation of resolution 1441 and sanction the use of force under UN mandate, Bush invaded Iraq before the second resolution passed in the UN, with Blair and the UK in tow. Regarding this development, Chilcot stated “In the absence of a majority of support of military action, we consider that the UK was, in fact, undermining the Security Council’s authority.” Chilcot did, however, refuse to make a judgment on the invasion’s legality, claiming he would leave it to an internationally recognized court, but opined that the legal basis for action was “far from satisfactory.”

As even the most casual observer of politics is aware, the U.S. president and UK Prime Minister do not merely decide to make foreign policy by caprice, but are at the center of a vast network of lobbies, special interest groups, and financial powers which have a vested interest in making policy that does not necessarily have “their” populations’ best interests in mind.

“Baron” Peter Goldsmith, a globalist barrister whose ethnic origins echo along Downing Street like the nasally mongering cries of a shtetl peddler, advised Blair that a second UN resolution could be useful for justifying an attack on Iraq after the country, according to Goldsmith, had committed unspecified material breaches of UN resolution 1441. In March 2003, with no UN resolution immediately forthcoming, Goldsmith advised Blair that “there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further Security Council resolution.” Chilcot noted that Blair needed to consult his cabinet at this venture, but did not.

Looking beyond Chilcot’s statement to the general report, one section is most relevant to the events leading up to March 2003. Section 5, entitled “Advice on the Legal Basis for Military Action, November 2002 to March 2003,” is particularly instructive on the legal finagling after UN resolution 1441. Much of the section details Goldsmith’s pessimism about the next step after UN resolution 1441, fearing that a UN decision to use force would be vetoed by the Russian Federation on the UNSC. Section 5 is replete with Goldsmith and Blair worrying that UN resolution 1441 would not be sufficient, with Goldsmith claiming that it was “hard not to read these words as indicating that it is for the Council [to] assess if an Iraqi breach is sufficiently significant in light of all the circumstances.”

In stepped Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, another co-religionist telling Goldsmith he need not worry, because “Mr. Straw thought that military action was some way further down the track but, ‘if Iraq were to be found in breach’ of resolution 1441, it would be ‘essential … we act pretty swiftly to take military action.'” One of Straw’s reasons “was that there might well be a need for less military force if action was swift.” Rushing into war with a haphazard legal basis and short preparation somehow ending in an easier victory, with less need for military force, is a level of strategic nincompoopery that only the matzo-soaked brain of a soft, rootless influence-peddler could devise. After Straw’s sagely advice, Goldsmith determined that Iraq had violated UN resolution 1411 because…Goldsmith said so. Straw and Goldsmith met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, fresh off an infamous presentation of hoax evidence of WMD to the UN on February 5, 2003, and the three continued their private war preparations while finding the legal holes to squeeze through and make it happen. Point 947 of the Executive Summary notes that, by March 17, 2003, “Lord Goldsmith told the Cabinet that it was ‘plain’ that Iraq had failed to comply with its obligations and continued to be in ‘material breach’ of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The authority to use force under resolution 678 was, as a result, revived. Lord Goldsmith said that there was no need for a further resolution.” Thus between the purely English and American patriotic fervor of Kunta Kinte, Schlomo, and Yitzhak, the sons of Roger, Thomas, James, and John were sent to do battle with Abdul bin Bombin’.

As it so happens, in 2007, while the Serious Fraud Office was investigating arms deals between BAE Systems and the House of Saud, Goldsmith called the office and ordered it to “shut it down™,” citing national security concerns but arousing accusations of a cover-up from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.

The Executive Summary’s conclusion includes two further points damning Goldsmith’s haste to go to war without securing a second UN resolution, or even advising Blair to consult his cabinet:

  • “951. None of those Ministers who had read Lord Goldsmith’s 7 March advice asked for an explanation as to why his legal view of resolution 1441 had changed.”
  • “952. There was little appetite to question Lord Goldsmith about his advice, and no substantive discussion of the legal issues was recorded.”

The report ended: “Since no agreement by majority of Security Council that Iraq had failed to take opportunity to comply with final offer of UN resolution 1441, Ministers, senior officials, and Cabinet should have been informed about legal uncertainties.”

In the House of Commons on March 18, 2003, acting on Goldsmith’s advice, Blair claimed that terrorist groups within Iraq, and Iraq’s possession of Weapons WMD, made it a “clear and present danger to Britain and its national security,” although the Joint Intelligence Committee had advised him that Iraq could not develop a nuclear weapon without sanctions, and its weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists if its government was destroyed.

Chilcot’s report notes that “It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.” Bush, Blair, and their advisors memed the dire and immediate threat of Iraq into existence in an echo chamber of confirmation bias, with vigorous agreement but few facts about what Jack Straw referred to as “vast stocks” of WMD that supposedly existed beyond doubt in Iraq.

Chilcot’s statement also noted that the British military contribution was decided upon very late before the invasion, and the ensuing security situation was assumed to be benign after the fall of Saddam’s government, but quickly unraveled. Blair claimed that his government couldn’t look back in hindsight, but the report says “We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.” Anyone with a working knowledge of Sunni/Shia/Kurd dynamics in Iraq, Saddam’s minority Sunni rule, based within the Sunni Triangle, the existence of the resentful majority Shia population, and the complete inability of sectarian Iraqi factions to cooperate in democratic power-sharing, should have foreseen the chaos that unfolded, as the report notes.

Chilcot praises the success of the British military operation to take Basra, and the courage of the military personnel who accomplished the task, but laments the “terrible suffering of the Iraqi people,” and the displacement of more than a million civilians, as well as the deaths of “at least one hundred and fifty thousand civilians” by 2009, an often disputed number with some leftist organizations claiming as many as two million civilian deaths.

Despite the immediate success on the road to Basra, the report criticizes the lack of ministerial oversight and planning for a broad range of outcomes in Iraq, claiming the plan was inflexible, unrealistic, and under-resourced. It asserts that the UK struggled to have a voice in the provisional government after the fall of Saddam’s government, and didn’t provide enough support to cover military and civilian responsibilities, most importantly security, with the sole strategy being to reduce forces as quickly as possible. The report also states that the military was unprepared for Improvised Explosive Devices, failing to supply a sufficient number of medium-weight protected patrol vehicles. Fittingly, the report ends with a tribute to the odious Churchill biographer Martin Gilbert.

The report’s findings will likely be politicized in the coming weeks. Several questions arise surrounding the executive power of the Prime Minister, international law, and the sovereignty of the UN. In the wake of the recent Brexit vote, the report’s implied support for relying on the UN Security Council for foreign policy decisions in the future may meet resistance, but will certainly provide a powerful talking point for those who would argue that a Prime Minister and a small handful of advisors should not have the power to commit the UK to following the U.S. into an ill-advised, hastily prepared war in a far-flung land.

The TRII is a gargantuan report, clocking in at 7,555 pages by my calculations. With David Miliband inadvertently evincing the impossibility of the report coming up with any truly damning results, the effort appears to fall in line with the Warren Commission on John F. Kennedy’s assassination, the 9/11 Report, and the FBI’s investigation of Hillary Clinton’s e-mail scandal. Looking to elites to expose conspiracies among other elites is a guaranteed exercise in futility. Just as FBI Director James Comey explained that Hillary and her staff performed one crime after another, but were absolved of intent and criminal guilt by being “reckless,” Chilcot’s report exposes Tony Blair and Lord Goldsmith’s hell-bent drive to join the U.S. in making war on Iraq after December 2002, but refuses to explain why such a drive occurred, or who was driving it. Was the rush to war in 2003 truly a result of blunders, mistakes, and poor intelligence, Bush and his “cowboy Christianity,” and Bush’s desire to avenge Saddam’s attempted assassination of his father, as we have been led to believe, or part of a latent predetermined agenda? Let’s take a look at the facts.

II. The Road to War

In 1996, The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), an “Israel-based” think tank based in Washington, DC (?), issued a political paper through its “Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000,” entitled “Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” Prepared for Benjamin Netanyahu by Richard Perle, David Wurmser, Douglas Feith, Robert Loewenberg, Meyrav Wurmser, and other “American as apple pie” strategists, the report suggests that:

“Israel can shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right — as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.”

The paper also states that “Since Iraq’s future could affect the strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly, it would be understandable that Israel has an interest in supporting the Hashemites in their efforts to redefine Iraq,” and “Most important, it is understandable that Israel has an interest supporting diplomatically, militarily and operationally Turkey’s and Jordan’s actions against Syria, such as securing tribal alliances with Arab tribes that cross into Syrian territory and are hostile to the Syrian ruling elite.” The paper concluded by quoting an Iraqi opposition member who stated that ” Israel must rejuvenate and revitalize its moral and intellectual leadership. It is an important — if not the most important–element in the history of the Middle East,” with the paper noting that ” Israel — proud, wealthy, solid, and strong — would be the basis of a truly new and peaceful Middle East.” The plan’s apparent prescience of parallels with later developments from ISIS, 18 years later, are worth noting.

Although the IASPS issued “Clean Break,” The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) took a leading role in developing and further planning its proposals in the Clinton and Bush administrations. “Clean Break” also became central to the advocacy of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) think-tank, the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an extremely influential lobbying group headquartered in Washington, DC, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, headed by Robert Satloff, author of Among the Righteous: Lost Stories from the Holocaust’s Long Reach into Arab Lands.

AIPAC’s influence has led to no shortage of scandals and criticism since its founding in 1963. Washington Congressman Brian Baird complained that “When key votes are cast, the question on the House floor, troublingly, is often not ‘What is the right thing to do for the United States of America?’ but ‘How is AIPAC going to score this? ’… We have member after member coming to the floor to vote on a resolution they’ve never read, about a report they’ve never seen, in a place they’ve never been.’” Minnesota Congresswoman Betty McCollum claimed in 2006 that AIPAC agents prevented her from entering her office after she criticized Israel, until she offered them a written apology.

Professors Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer exposed AIPAC in the 2007 book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, writing that “AIPAC’s success is due to its ability to reward legislators and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those who challenge it… Those seen as hostile to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign contributions to their political opponents. … The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress. Open debate about U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there.”

In 1992, AIPAC President David Steiner was caught bragging about procuring votes for Bill Clinton in return for a multi-billion dollar aid package for Israel, as well as claiming that he was negotiating the selection of the Clinton administration’s next Secretary of State, and said that AIPAC had placed “a dozen people in [the Clinton] campaign, in the headquarters… in Little Rock, and they’re all going to get big jobs.”

In 2005, AIPAC policy director Steven Rosen and analyst Keith Weissmann were indicted for illegally conspiring to gather and disclose secret national security intelligence to Israel. By pure coincidence, Rosen and Weissmann had the charges dropped, while the goyische agent who supplied information to them, Lawrence Franklin, was sentenced to 151 months in prison. By another coincidence, Franklin worked in the office of Douglas Feith, a key member of PNAC, JINSA, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Bush Administration.

Together, AIPAC, JINSA, and PNAC (now Foreign Policy Initiative) form the core of neoconservative advocacy. In the wake of the Iraq War, the intellectual and ethnic roots of this particular movement have come under increased scrutiny. A quick look at the roster of prominent neocons, including Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, John Podhoretz, Elliott Cohen, David Frum, Joshua Bolten, Joel Kaplan, Blake Gottesman, Charles “Scooter” Libby, Harriet Miers, and many more, all of whom served in the Bush administration or championed the Iraq War in the media, and all of whom derived their principles from Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and Leo Strauss, who derived their principles from Lev Bronshtein, would seem to indicate a certain ethnic background that in which even Inspector Clouseau might find a pattern.

On the other hand, Robert Kagan appeared on The Steve Malzberg Show to claim that Pat Buchanan “misunderstood” U.S. policy by blaming neocons for the Iraq War, claiming that Buchanan and other “hateful critics” used certain “connotations” when using the term “neocon,” which were inaccurate because “some of the original thinkers whose ideas have now been characterized as by this general term ‘neoconservative’ were in fact Jewish, and it often carries conspiratorial tones on the part of people who throw the term around.” You can rest assured, goyim, that the dire threat of WMD was the exclusive reason for going into Iraq, as Perle noted: “We were not doing it as he [Buchanan] has sometimes suggested on behalf of any other government.” If you are thinking “Hey, wait a second. Wasn’t Perle the guy who personally authored ‘Clean Break’ for Bibi Netanyahu, which explicitly stated that deposing Saddam was the goal, and explicitly stated that it would be on behalf of Israel,” expel those thoughts immediately. You don’t want to be a “hateful critic” or “conspiracy theorist” there, shegetz. You also don’t want to remember that Perle portended that the Iraq War would be a “cakewalk.”

One such hateful critic was U.S. General Anthony Zinni. Gen. Zinni, a past chief of the U.S. Central Command and President Bush’s former Middle East special envoy, told The Washington Post that “The more he listened to [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz and other administration officials talk about Iraq, the more Zinni became convinced that interventionist ‘neoconservative’ ideologues were plunging the nation into a war in a part of the world they didn’t understand. ‘The more I saw, the more I thought that this was the product of the neocons,” and told 60 Minutes that the neoconservatives’ role in pushing the war for Israel’s benefit was “the worst-kept secret in Washington.” Three days earlier, Senator Ernest rose on the Senate floor to defend a newspaper essay he had written earlier in the month making the same charge. Both men later complained that they had been unfairly labeled antisemitic for speaking out.

In response to Zinni’s allegations, journalist Joel Mowbray penned a piece for Town Hall entitled “General Zinni, What a Ninny,” claiming: “Discussing the Iraq war with the Washington Post last week, former General Anthony Zinni took the path chosen by so many anti-Semites: he blamed it on the Jews. Neither President Bush nor Vice-President Cheney – nor for that matter Zinni’s old friend, Secretary of State Colin Powell – was to blame. It was the Jews.” Humorously enough, Zinni was shocked to find out that Wolfowitz, Perle, Feith, and so many others he had been dealing with were Jews, which only learned upon being told that by calling out “neocons,” he was calling out Jews, with the two terms apparently being synonymous in the eyes of their defenders.

Since Chilcot’s report confirms that Tony Blair was determined to follow the Bush administration on its plans for Iraq, and we now understand the origin of foreign policymaking in the Middle East under the Bush Administration, with strong hints of the ethnic motivating force behind it and Israel as the explicit beneficiary, we can move on to more concrete facts about the preparation for the intelligence used to justify Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Some of you might recall the name “Valerie Plame Wilson,” a former undercover CIA agent and wife of former U.S. diplomat Joseph Wilson. After a trip to Niger to investigate rumors of Saddam’s attempted acquisition of yellowcake uranium for the building of a nuclear weapon, promoted by a British government “white paper,” Wilson wrote an op-ed for the New York Times entitled “What I Didn’t Find in Africa.” When Wilson noted that Niger was not producing yellowcake, he claimed, a State Department official told him that “perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia.” In retribution for Wilson’s impudent behavior, the Bush administration retaliated by exposing Plame’s identity through Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in a column written by Robert Novak in the Washington Post. Though the leak was widely suspected to run at least as high as Vice President Dick Cheney, Cheney’s Chief of Staff Charles “Scooter” Libby took the fall. New York Times reporter Judith Miller wrote several columns about Saddam’s WMD program leading up to the war that were later found to be based on faulty information, and she also went to jail for failing to disclose a source involved in the Plame leak. Miller, Novak, and Libby, like so many involved in the lead up to the Iraq War, leave a legacy that will echo throughout the ages.

The Chilcot report quotes Tony Blair as writing “ I agreed with the basic US analysis of Saddam as a threat; I thought he was a monster; and to break the US partnership in such circumstances, when America’s key allies were all rallying round, would in my view, then (and now) have done major long-term damage to that relationship” in his memoir. Lord Andrew Turnbull, head of Her Majesty’s Civil Service from 2002 to 2005, wrote that Blair considered the use of consulting his cabinet in the following terms: “I like to move fast. I don’t want to spend a lot of time in kind of conflict resolution, and, therefore, I will get the people who will make this thing move quickly and efficiently.” Given that Blair was dedicated to following Bush wherever he led, without pause or consultation, given the Valerie Plame affair, just how solid was the evidence that so enamored Lord Goldsmith of the Iraq War’s necessity?

Anyone familiar with the farcical “one-man London apartment operation” referred to as “The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights,” aka Rami Abdul Rahman the three-time convicted criminal and part-time clothing store owner, and its frequent sourcing by the press, might consider the source of information on Saddam’s WMD program: Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi expat who had amassed a nine-figure fortune despite leaving a trail of corruption accusations, including a conviction in absentia after fleeing the $350 million collapse of a Jordanian bank he co-founded.

After developing a close relationship with Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, Chalabi was promoted as a champion for democracy by the lobbying group BKSH & Associates, which apparently felt no qualms about its actions on behalf of Ahmed “Give me liberty, or give me falafel!” Chalabi while also lobbying for several undemocratic African dictators. Leaks from a source in Chalabi’s organization named “Curveball” suddenly began to fuel the drive to war. They included stories of mobile bio-weapons factories operating on railroad tracks among other absurdities. Although the Central Intelligence Agency was skeptical of “Curveball,” the British Secret Intelligence Service questioned his claims, and the German Federal Intelligence Service outright branded “Curveball” a liar, a commission appointed by Bush and headed by Judge Laurence Silbermann determined that “Curveball” had no connection to Chalabi, and thus should cast no doubt on Chalabi’s reports on WMD programs in Iraq. The informant was later revealed to be Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, and was described by a CIA official as “a guy trying to get his green card essentially, in Germany, and playing the system for what it was worth.” Al-Janabi has since found comfort from his travails by being granted asylum in Germany, where the poor soul can ficki-ficki in peace.

Undeterred by the Islamophobia of the intelligence agencies doubting “Curveball,” Chalabi continued leaking information about WMD programs to Judith Miller and her co-religionist, the American Enterprise Institute’s Danielle Pletka. After the fall of the Iraqi government, Chalabi served as interim Minister of Oil, a lucrative and influential position, before becoming Deputy Prime Minister. Although a secret British Overseas and Defence Secretariat paper from 2002 described Chalabi as “a convicted fraudster popular on Capitol Hill,” his leaks played the central role in building the intelligence used by Bush and Blair to justify the Iraq invasion. When coalition forces failed to uncover the WMD described by Chalabi, and attempted to divert the press attention suddenly falling on them to Chalabi, he responded “We are heroes in error. As far as we’re concerned, we’ve been entirely successful. That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad. What was said before is not important. The Bush administration is looking for a scapegoat.”

Imagine a junkie thief who handed a dollar to a local hobo named “Slippery Pete,” so Pete could tell the thief that some jewels in his neighbor’s house had whispered that they wished to be liberated from a jewelry case. In the deranged mind of a junkie, such a story may seem plausible to a jury. When Slippery Pete is Ahmed Chalabi, and the criminal is two of the leading global powers attempting to justify a war rather than rob jewels, we have an adequate metaphor to describe the likelihood that the U.S. and UK were following a posteriori evidence, rather than coming to an a priori determination to invade Iraq, slinging Chalabi along to provide some of the flimsiest evidence imaginable, baseless and self-motivated rumors. Then again, considering the “enormous positive reverberations” that Netanyahu assuredly would never lie about, such trivialities as legitimate evidence are really just narrow thinking. As we have come to understand with our recent Iran Deal, the mere conceptualization of the possibility of having a nuclear program, when speaking of the wrong regime, is far more dangerous than the estimated 200 nuclear weapons in Israel’s illegal secret nuclear weapons arsenal, which exists outside the purvey of inspections from the IAEA, with Israel not having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It sure is a good thing that Obama and the U.S. Congress apologized for the terrible affront that the Iran Deal represented by promising increased aid for Israel’s Iron Dome program, and a record-high, multi-year, multi-billion dollar aid package for the future, the anti-semitic Symington Amendment be damned!

If one is to lend Tony Blair at least enough credit to assume that he was not a bozo stumbling into a war because he believed Ahmed Chalabi, aka Slippery Pete, one might look into the money behind Tony Blair, and following the money is always a good predictor by which to judge a politician’s actions. Among Blair’s fundraisers and contributors were: Lord Michael Levy, Lord Simon, Lord Woolf, Sir Ronald Cohen, Sir Sigmund Sternberg, Gideon Meir, Isaac Kaye, Joel Joffe, Tony Tabatznik, Alex Bernstein, John Ritblatt, Lord Diamond, Norman Hyams, Sir Alan Sugar, and other upstanding, unimpeachable businessmen and lobbyists who assuredly earned their fortunes by the sweat of their own brows, so don’t be jealous of their success, you shkotzim. Blair’s six figure salary advising J.P. Morgan-Chase, $250,000 going rate for speeches, job teaching a course on globalization at Yale University, and advising job with Zurich Financial Services are, likewise, solely the result of being a straightforward man and not at all a quid pro quo, as I’m certain that James Comey’s future success in the private sector will be, just like Hillary Clinton’s lucrative speeches. These people are simply that good at oratory, goy.

It is certainly possible to point at Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other gentiles and assume that the ethnicity of so many of the aforementioned neocons, and Judith Miller, and Robert Novak, and so many of Blair’s contributors are pure coincidence. It may be that our elites are just stumbling from one private e-mail server into one ill-fated immigration plan after another, back into an ill-advised war based on not faulty but nonexistent evidence, and John Chilcot, like James Comey, is just an understanding guy who is willing to overlook some simple “Whoops a Daisy!” mistakes. On the other hand, a policy paper written in Washington DC for Netanyahu, lobbied for by one Jewish neocon after another, a U.S. presidential administration rife with dual-citizens and members of AIPAC, PNAC, and JINSA, a prime minister drowning in Jewish money, and Jewish journalists actively promoting discredited WMD intelligence, while discrediting Joseph Wilson for discrediting their evidence, may just suggest that Jews have power that extends beyond the reach of, say, Tahitians.

Oh, silly me, I forgot that Robert Kagan said there was nothing to see here. Kagan, as a co-founder of PNAC with “Never Trump” Bill Kristol, Kagan the neo “conservative” now advising Hillary, while he is married to Victoria “Fuck the EU” Nuland (real name: Nudelman), who is currently working with Treasury Secretary Jewess billionaire Penny Pritzker, is sufficient by himself to establish my point (though I suspect many of our readers will at least agree with the sentiment of “Fuck the EU,” if for different purposes). With the multiple other lines of converging evidence, we come to the blindingly obvious conclusion that it was not merely Blair and the UK following George Bush and the U.S. into the Iraq War for no apparent reason, but Jewish lobbyists, think-tank wonks, and media figures manipulating their host countries into a war for Israel, plunging the U.S. into trillions more debt to the Federal Reserve to do so.

Just as Bernard-Henri Lévy’s Libya fiasco went, Iraq went. This raises a darker question than even the ethnic driving force behind the Iraq War, a question of whether the strategic blunders and almost unbelievable incompetence with which the war was conducted was more than an accident. Halliburton and various defense contractors would seemingly have little to complain about from the profits of such an extended conflict. While a chosenite-bashing sleuth like myself will never be privy to the deepest secrets of such policymakers, the profits, coincidental influx of refugees from such conflicts, and flexibility to extend domestic surveillance capabilities over the native populations provided by the never-ending War on Terror would certainly have several members of the deep state who wouldn’t mind such developments.

It may be that Wolfowitz, Feith, Goldsmith and their ilk are simply soft influence-peddlers who were in over their heads and clueless about how to handle the war they started, as the hapless Gen. Zinni claimed. It may be that they and their successors witnessed Muhammad Reza Shah-Pahlavi fall and be replaced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Saddam fall to AQI and eventually be replaced by the same kind of sectarian, partisan rule of the Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Muammar Gaddafi fall and be replaced by the chaos and mass immigration to Europe that he prophesied, and still think that the “moderate rebels” in Syria will lead to a glorious birth of democracy in the Moslem world. I wouldn’t count on such beneficent, doe-eyed intentions.

Brexit may contain within it the seeds of the beginning of “the great push back” against the forces that have been chipping away at Western civilization, but we are far from the goal. Those brown people will keep on coming, and breeding, and those selfless advocates of democracy in countries near Israel will keep on advocating, no matter how many Muslim Brotherhoods pop up to replace all the Hosni Mubaraks who once provided stability. Even if Donald Trump gets elected and does all he promises to do to begin to work back toward a de facto European population in America, even if the UK breaks the shackles of not only the EU but pushes back the rising brown tide that threatens it and all of Europe and its children, the task of “Brexiting” from the foreign policy insiders that have thrust us into such disasters, to their profit and our bleeding, will need to be completed and these policymakers removed from power, permanently. We certainly can not rely on the compromised Chilcots or Comeys of the world to do their jobs and truly expose their friends within the club; we can only rely on ourselves, and our small but growing movement, to take back our countries beyond the tepid civic nationalism of so many of our supposed “right-wing extremist” parties, many of whom would be quite familiar with the many coincidental people I outlined in this article.

In an address to the House of Commons on November 18, 1998, Tony Blair stated:

“We do not take Iraqi words at face value. Long experience has taught us to do the opposite … we and the Americans have suspended further military action while we bolt down every detail of what the Iraqis have said, and while we test the words in practice …As ever, we do not rely on the good faith of Saddam Hussein. He has none. We know, however, that under the threat of force, we can make him move. We will be watching him with extreme care and a high degree of scepticism … we and the Americans remain ready, willing and able to go back to the use of force at any time. There will be no further warnings. The inspectors will now carry out their work.”

I believe some amending is in order for Blair’s words, in the wake of the flaccid meanderings of the Chilcot report:

“We do not take ZOG words at face value. Long experience has taught us to do the opposite … we and the rest of the goyim have suspended further consent for our engineered replacement while we bolt down every detail of what the chosen have said, and while we test the Yiddish words in practice … As ever, we do not rely on the good faith of Der Ewige Jude. He has none. We know, however, that under the threat of force, we can make him do honest labor for the first time in history, or go back to Israel for good. We will be watching him with extreme care and a high degree of skepticism … we and the alt-right remain ready, willing and able to go back to the use of memes at any time. There will be no further warnings. The coincidence detectors will now carry out their work.”